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We introduce a domain-theoretic foundation for disjunctive logic programming. This foundation is
built on clausal logic, a representation of the Smyth powerdomain of any coherent algebraic dcpo. We
establish the completeness of a resolution rule for inference in such a clausal logic; we introduce a
natural declarative semantics and a fixed-point semantics for disjunctive logic programs, and prove
their equivalence; finally, we apply our results to give both a syntax and semantics for default logic in
any coherent algebraic dcpo. C° 2001 Elsevier Science
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1. INTRODUCTION
Domain theory, as introduced by Scott in the 1970s, has many connections with logic. Such con-
nections are usually made by extracting an appropriate language/syntax from a category of domains.
To name a few examples, we have Abramsky’s “domain theory in logical form” [Abr91], Scott’s own
representation of Scott domains as information systems [Sco82], extended to other domains by Zhang
[Zha91], and Smyth’s treatment of observable properties as open sets [Smy83], expanded to the ideas
of topological systems and locales in Vickers [Vic89]. There has been much investigation into the use
of domain logics as logics of types and of program correctness, mainly for imperative and functional
languages. Surprisingly, though, there has been relatively little work tying domain theory to the seman-
tics of logic programming [Apt90], in particular disjunctive logic programming [LMR92]. Most of this
work focuses on first-order logic. Extensions to higher types have been made—for example, ‚-Prolog
[NM98]—but domain theory has not played as much of a role here as it has for functional programming.
In this paper we offer some potentially appropriate spaces—coherent algebraic domains—for the
semantics of disjunctive logic programs, perhaps even of higher type, though much work would be
required to substantiate this. Our idea is that disjunctive logic programs can be seen as nondetermin-
istic programs in the standard sense of nondeterministic computation and not so much as declarative
representations. For this purpose we use the Smyth powerdomain construction [Smy78].
In this paper we show how to represent the Smyth powerdomain of a coherent algebraic dcpo using
an elementary logic built over such a domain. This is a clausal logic, different from the modal logic
introduced by Winskel [Win83] for the Smyth powerdomain. We obtain the logic by regarding finite
sets of compact elements of a domain disjunctively as clauses of an abstract partial logic and sets
of clauses conjunctively as theories. We prove our representation theorem (Theorem 3.2) using the
Hofmann–Mislove theorem [HM81]. This proof makes clear the basic Galois connection (duality)
between theories in the clausal logic and sets of models as Scott-compact saturated sets. The main result
yields a compactness theorem for any clausal logic over a coherent algebraic domain. We prove the
usual compactness theorem in classical logic as a corollary.
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Next we show that the resolution rule, appropriately generalized to clauses over coherent algebraic
dcpos, gives a complete inference procedure for the clausal logic. We apply these results to give a
fixed-point semantics for abstract disjunctive logic programs. We then establish the agreement between
this semantics and the natural declarative semantics (i.e., the set of logical consequences).
Our research into these questions was initiated by using domain theory to provide a model for
nonmonotonic reasoning in AI, as exemplified by Reiter’s default logic [Rei80]. We used the Smyth
powerdomain, in its model-theoretic incarnation as a domain of compact saturated sets, as a setting for
a semantic version of default reasoning called power default reasoning [ZR97a]. In the final section
of this paper, we provide a simple syntactic version of default logic whose semantics is exactly the
semantics of power defaults. This logic is derived naturally from disjunctive logic programs, and its
proof-theoretic semantics is essentially that of the fixed-point semantics of disjunctive logic programs,
modified to include a so-called consistency check.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminary definitions from domain theory.
For those readers unfamiliar with these concepts we use the running example of Kleene’s three-valued
propositional logic with strong negation. The representation result is the subject of Section 3. Section 4
is a study of the resolution rule, and Section 5 treats logic programs. Finally, Section 6 gives applications
to default logic.
2. PRELIMINARIES
This section contains standard definitions from domain theory. For those readers unfamiliar with
the theory, we provide the running example of Kleene’s three-valued propositional logic. For our
compactness results we use the Hofmann–Mislove theorem. A lemma providing the essence of the
proof of this theorem can be found in Keimel and Paseka [KP94]; see also Vickers [Vic89].
DEFINITION 2.1. A poset is a pair (D;v), where D is a nonempty set and v is a reflexive, antisym-
metric, and transitive relation on D. If D has a least element we write this as ?. When x v y we
sometimes say “x subsumes y.”
DEFINITION 2.2. A nonempty subset X of a poset D is directed iff for any x; y in X there is a z in X
with x v z and y v z.
A typical example of a directed set is a nonempty totally ordered subset (chain) of D. Chains and
directed sets provide us with an abstract notion of “approximating sequence,” where “approximation”
is in the sense of learning more and more specific information. We require approximating sequences
to “converge” to a “limit,” which is the least upper bound of the directed set or chain. This is captured
by
DEFINITION 2.3. A directed complete partial order (dcpo) is a poset (D;v) with a bottom element
? and such that for any directed X µ D there is a least upper bound F X 2 D.
EXAMPLE 2.1. We begin our running example by introducing the syntax for Kleene’s three-valued
logic. This is given by the following recursive specification (where Var is a given countable set of
propositional variables)::
` ::D x(2 Var) j true j false j (` ^ ˆ) j (` _ ˆ) j :`:
Strings in this language will be called propositional formulas or just formulas. This syntax is the
same as that of standard propositional logic; the difference lies in the semantics. The meaning of a
propositional formula is specified by its behavior on partial truth assignments (ptas). A pta is a function
e : Var! f0; 1;?g, with 1 understood as “true,” 0 as “false,” and ? as “undefined.” Note that we use
truth values 0 and 1 in truth assignments, instead of false and true. This is to keep clear the distinction,
at least temporarily, between syntax and semantics.
It is customary to describe a pta by a string of literals: variables or their complements. For example,
abcd represents the pta which maps a and b to 1, and c and d to 0 (with all other variables mapping
to ?).
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The set of all ptas forms a dcpo [Var!f0; 1;?g] by defining the order pointwise: e v e0 if
e(x) v e0(x) for every x 2 Var , where the truth values are ordered by letting ? v 0 and ? v 1
(0 and 1 will thus be incomparable). We write T for this cpo, pictured below.
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DEFINITION 2.4. Let (D;v) be a poset, and Aµ D. The upper closure of A, written "A, is the set of
all d 2 D such that for some a 2 A, a v d. A is upward closed if A D"A. Similarly for lower closure
(use #). The set of minimal elements of a subset X of D is written „X .
EXAMPLE 2.2. A typical example of an upper-closed set is the set of satisfiers (models) of a 3-valued
propositional formula. To fix terminology, we introduce the truth tables for the connectives _;^, and
:, usually attributed to Kleene.
^ 1 0 ?
1 1 0 ?
0 0 0 0
? ? 0 ?
_ 1 0 ?
1 1 1 1
0 1 0 ?
? 1 ? ?
:
1 0
0 1
? ?
These truth tables provide a method to evaluate any formula under a partial truth assignment. Given
any pta e : Var ! T, write [[`]](e) for the evaluation of the formula ` under the pta e. We have,
inductively,
1. [[true]](e)D 1; [[false]](e)D 0;
2. [[v]](e)D e(v) for v 2Var;
3. [[` ^ ˆ]](e)D ^ ([[`]](e); [[ˆ]](e)), where ^ is obtained from the first truth table above.
4. Similarly for the connectives : and _.
Given a pta e and a formula `, we say that e is a (positive) satisfier or model of ` if [[`]](e) D 1. In
this case we also write e jD`. (Similarly, e is a negative satisfier of ` if [[`]](e) D 0.) It is easy to show
that for any formula `, the set
[[`]] D fe j e jD`g
is upward-closed. This property is also sometimes called the persistence property.
DEFINITION 2.5. Let (D;v) be a dcpo. A compact (finite) element e of D is one such that whenever
e vF L with L directed, we also have e v y for some y 2 L . The set of compact elements of a dcpo
D is written as K(D).
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EXAMPLE 2.3. In the dcpo D D [Var! T] of ptas, an element e is compact if and only if it maps
all but a finite number of variables to ?.
DEFINITION 2.6. An algebraic dcpo is a directed complete partial order such that every element is
the directed join of the finite elements that subsume it. A Scott domain is an algebraic dcpo in which
every consistent (bounded from above) subset has a least upper bound.
The idea of an algebraic domain is that roughly one can obtain information about any element by
taking a suitable approximating sequence of prespecified finite elements. A Scott domain has this
property and in a sense is like a lattice as well.
EXAMPLE 2.4. The domain D D [Var! T] is in fact a Scott domain. Here is a picture of a non-Scott
domain:
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We turn to the important notion of the Scott topology on a dcpo.
DEFINITION 2.7. Let (D;v) be a dcpo. A set U µ D is said to be Scott open if (i) it is upward closed;
and (ii) for any directed L µ D, we haveF L 2U iff U \ L 6D ;. The set of Scott-opens of D is denoted
˜D. An open set is compact open if it is a compact element of the lattice (˜D;µ).
A Scott-open set captures, first of all, the notion of an affirmative predicate on D. A predicate (set)
U is said to be affirmative if, whenever an element x 2U , it is somehow possible to test that x 2U with
a finite number of tests. That is, if x D Ffd 2K(D) j d v xg and x 2U then for some d v x , d is
compact and d 2U .
The collection of affirmative predicates on a set should therefore be closed under finite intersections
and arbitrary unions and contain the empty set and the whole space, thus forming a topological space.
But this is not all that is captured by the Scott topology. One can reclaim the order v on D because
x v y iff for all Scott-open U , if x 2U then y 2U . Furthermore, an element e2 D is compact if and
only if "e is compact open.
EXAMPLE 2.5. In the domain D D [Var! T], a set M is compact open iff it is the set of satisfiers of
some propositional formula. The easiest way to see this is to notice that any formula is equivalent (in the
sense of having the same positive and negative satisfiers) to a formula in disjunctive normal form (DNF).
One can get a unique DNF by discarding disjuncts which are nonminimal; for example in a _ (a ^ b)
one can discard the disjunct (a ^ b), because a v ab. Each remaining disjunct then corresponds to a
minimal pta in the set of satisfiers of the formula; the upward closure of the set of minimal satisfying
pta’s is a compact open set, because it is a finite union of the compact opens determined by taking the
upward closure of each minimal pta. Conversely, in any algebraic domain, one can prove that a set M is
compact open iff it is the upward closure of a finite number of compact elements. So if a set of elements
of [Var ! T] is compact open, one can read off a DNF formula by obtaining the minimal elements
of M .
In general, an open set in this domain can be thought of as the set of satisfiers of an infinite disjunction
of finite conjunctions of literals (variables or their complements.)
DEFINITION 2.8. An algebraic dcpo is said to be coherent if the intersection of any two compact open
sets is compact open.
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EXAMPLE 2.6. The non-Scott domain in Example 2.4 is coherent. In fact, every finite poset with ?
will be coherent algebraic. For an infinite counterexample, let N be the domain
fa0 w a1 w : : :g [ fc; d;?g;
where c and d are incomparable elements below all the ai s and? is the bottom element. The intersection
U of "c with "d is open, because it is the infinite union of the compact open sets "ai . But this union
is not compact open, for the collection f "ai j i 2!g is directed and its union is U , but U is not a subset
of any "ai .
In this paper all domains will be coherent algebraic.
DEFINITION 2.9. A Scott-open filter is a collection J of Scott open subsets of D which is closed
under intersection and superset and such that if a directed union of opens is in J , then some open in
the directed collection is also in J . A filter is proper if it does not contain the empty set (iff it is not the
lattice of all Scott opens).
EXAMPLE 2.7. In three-valued logic, a filter corresponds to a collection of logical equivalence classes
of finite formulas in some set T of formulas. The formulas are represented first as DNF clauses and then
as compact open sets, together with infinite DNF formulas—arbitrary disjunctions of finite conjunctions,
represented by general Scott open sets. Scott-open filters are those for which arbitrary Scott-open sets
always correspond to infinite disjunctive formulas which are weakenings of finite formulas in the
theory T .
In somewhat more detail, we can think of Scott-open filters as being determined by logically closed
theories. Recall that a theory T entails a formula ` means that every pta e satisfying (positively) every
formula in T must also satisfy `. A theory T is logically closed if every formula entailed by T is in T .
For a logically closed theory T let
J (T ) D fU 2˜D j (9` 2 T )([[`]]µU )g:
We claim that J (T ) is a Scott-open filter. Clearly it is closed under superset. Let U ¶ [[`]] and V ¶ [[ˆ]]
be members of J (T ). Then U \V ¶ Z D [[`^ˆ]]. Clearly `^ˆ is entailed by T and so this formula is
in T . This shows J (T ) is closed under intersection. Last, we check the Scott-open property. Suppose the
directed union
S
i Ui is a member of J (T ). Then for some ` 2 T , [[`]]µ
S
i Ui . Since [[`]] is compact
open, [[`]]µUi for some i . This proves Ui 2 J (T ) for some i .
We use the notion of Scott-open filter to help relate the logical notion of compactness to the topological
notion. The logical notion is often taken to be that if a formula is a consequence of a collection T of
formulas, then it is a consequence of a finite subcollection F of T . The following gives the topological
notion:
DEFINITION 2.10. A subset C of a dcpo D is said to be compact if the collection fU 2˜D j C µU g
is a Scott-open filter.
It is an easy exercise to show that (working in the Scott topology) this definition is equivalent to the
standard topological definition: every open covering of C has a finite subcovering. We will show in the
next section how to connect this topological definition to the logical one.
We need one more technical definition, which we use below to characterize the possible sets which
can be the set of models of a theory:
DEFINITION 2.11. A subset S of a dcpo is said to be saturated iff it is the intersection of all Scott-open
sets which contain it. (This is equivalent to its being upward-closed.)
Finally, we recall some definitions relevant to the Smyth powerdomain of an algebraic dcpo. The
original idea of powerdomains was to lift the underlying order in a domain to the powerset level, thus
providing a domain-theoretic semantics for nondeterminism. There are several natural ways to do this,
depending on how we relate order in sets of domain elements to the underlying order of the domain.
For us, the appropriate tool is the Smyth preorder, defined below. This preorder is defined on finite sets
188 ROUNDS AND ZHANG
of compact elements of the underlying domain and then extended to a partial order using the technique
of ideal completion. The relevant definitions are as follows.
DEFINITION 2.12. Let (P;„) be a preordered set (i.e., „ is reflexive and transitive). An ideal of P is
a subset I of P which is downward closed and directed (these notions make sense for the preorder „).
An ideal is proper iff it is not equal to D. The (proper) ideal completion of a preordered set (P;„) is
the set of all (proper) ideals of P , ordered by inclusion.
DEFINITION 2.13. The Smyth preorder on a collection of subsets of a dcpo (D;v) is defined by
setting X v] Y iff for every element y 2 Y there is an element x 2 X with x v y.
DEFINITION 2.14. Let (D;v) be an algebraic dcpo. The Smyth powerdomain P](D) is defined to be
the proper ideal completion of the collection Pf (K(D)) of finite sets of compact elements of D, under
the Smyth preorder.
This definition of the Smyth powerdomain usually proves to be cumbersome, which is why we do
not provide examples. One way to simplify matters is given by the following result. For a proof see
[AJ94].
THEOREM 2.15. The Smyth powerdomain P](D) of an algebraic dcpo (D;v) is isomorphic to
the domain consisting of all nonempty Scott-compact saturated subsets of D; ordered by reverse
set inclusion. The compact elements of the powerdomain are the nonempty compact open subsets
of D.
Our representation result, which works in any coherent algebraic dcpo D, is that the Smyth pow-
erdomain of D can be viewed as the set of all logically closed consistent theories over D, where a
“formula” in D is just a set of compact elements, and a theory is a set of formulas. The relevant ordering
on logically closed theories is just set inclusion. In fact, logically closed consistent theories are nothing
more or less than proper ideals using the Smyth preorder (cf. Proposition 3.5).
3. THEORIES
The following definition contains ideas essential for the rest of the paper.
DEFINITION 3.1. Let D be a coherent algebraic dcpo (with ?) and let K(D) be the set of compact
elements of D. We define a clause to be a finite subset of K(D). A theory is a set of clauses. For w 2 D,
and a clause X , we say that w jD X if there is a c2 X with c v w. For a theory T we say that w is a
model of T , and write w jD T , if w jD X for all X 2 T . We say that T jD X if for all w, if w jD T then
w jD X . (If T is a singleton set, say fZg, then we just write Z jD X .) A theory T is closed if for all X ,
T jD X ) X 2 T . A theory is consistent if it does not entail (jD) the empty clause. Equivalently, there
is a w such that w jD T .
We allow a theory to contain no clauses. Every w will satisfy this theory; it is in fact logically
equivalent to the theory consisting of one clause f?g.
EXAMPLE 3.1. For three-valued logic, we adopt an abstract syntax where a disjunction of a conjunc-
tion of literals is simply represented as an abstract clause obtained by taking a conjunction of literals to
be the corresponding pta and the disjunction of these conjuncts to be a set of these ptas. For example,
(a _ (a ^:b)_ (b^:c)) translates domain-theoretically to fa; a ¯b; bc¯g. With this translation, the other
parts of the above definition should be very familiar.
Theories over a domain D are another way of talking about the ideal completion of D under the
Smyth preorder. The essential connection is that a clause X entails a clause Y if and only if Y v] X in
the Smyth preorder. With all of this in mind, we can state our main representation theorem.
THEOREM 3.2. Let D be a coherent algebraic dcpo. The collection of all nonempty Scott-compact
saturated subsets of D; ordered by reverse inclusion, is isomorphic to the set of all consistent closed
theories over D; ordered by inclusion.
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To prove this theorem, we provide an order-isomorphism between the collection of theories and the
collection of compact saturated sets. We can then use Theorem 2.15 to connect compact saturated sets to
the original definition of the Smyth powerdomain as an ideal completion, or we can use Proposition 3.5 to
see this directly. For the proof we need the Hofmann–Mislove theorem [HM81]. Refer to the definitions
of Scott-open filters (Definition 2.9) and compact saturated sets (Definitions 2.10, 2.11).
LEMMA 3.1 (Hofmann–Mislove). Let D be an algebraic dcpo. There is a 1-1 order-preserving
correspondence between the collection of (proper) Scott-open filters over D; ordered by inclusion, and
the (nonempty) compact saturated subsets of D; ordered by reverse inclusion. This is given by the map
sending a filter F toTU 2 F U ; the inverse map sends the compact saturated set K to fU 2˜D j K µU g.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3.2). We show that there is an order isomorphism between the closed
theories and the compact saturated sets over D. We start with traditional maps in logic.
DEFINITION 3.3. Let K be compact saturated. Define Th(K ) to be the set fX j (8m 2 K )(m jD X )g.
For any theory T let [[T ]] denote the set of models of T .
These maps are inverses of each other, provided their domains are appropriate:
LEMMA 3.2. If T is logically closed; then Th([[T ]]) D T .
Proof. Clearly T µ Th([[T ]]). For the converse, we need to show that T jD X whenever X 2 Th([[T ]]).
But if m jD T then m 2 [[T ]]. Thus m jD X by definition of Th.
LEMMA 3.3. If K is compact saturated; then [[Th(K )]] D K .
Proof. Clearly K µ [[Th(K )]]. For the converse, let m 2 [[Th(K )]]. Then m 2"X for all "X ¶ K . We
claim that w 2U for all Scott-open U ¶ K . The reason is that U is the union of all "d for d a minimal
element of U , so this collection forms an open cover of K . By compactness there is a finite subcover;
let "X be the union of this finite subcover. Then m 2"X and so m 2U . The conclusion follows since
K is saturated.
It is easy to check that Th(K ) is logically closed for any K . Also, [[¢]] is clearly order-reversing.
Therefore, to prove Theorem 3.2, it suffices to prove that for any (consistent) theory T , the set [[T ]] is
(nonempty) compact saturated. We do this by factoring the map [[¢]] through the collection of (proper)
Scott-open filters and then applying the Hofmann–Mislove theorem. For a logically closed theory T let
J (T ) D fU j (9X 2 T )("X µU )g:
We claim that in a coherent algebraic domain, this collection is a Scott-open filter. The proof mirrors
the reasoning in Example 2.7. We need to check closure under superset and intersection, together
with the Scott-open property. The first and third of these checks follow exactly as in Example 2.7.
For closure under intersection, let U ¶"X and V ¶"Y be members of J (T ), with X; Y 2 T . Then
U \V ¶ Z D"X \ "Y . Since D is coherent, Z is compact open and the set „Z of minimal elements of
Z is a clause entailed by T (a satisfier of X and Y must be in Z , so above some minimal element of Z ).
Therefore „Z 2 T and so U \ V 2 J (T ). This shows J (T ) is closed under intersection and establishes
our claim.
But we have that
T
J (T ) D [[T ]]. To see this, let w 2 [[T ]] and U be such that "X µU for some
X 2 T . Thenw 2 "X µU . Conversely, letw 2 TF . Take an arbitrary X 2 T . Then "X is a set U ¶"X ,
so w 2 "X . Thus w jD X for all X 2 T and so w 2 [[T ]]. We conclude that [[T ]] is compact saturated,
by the Hofmann–Mislove theorem. This completes the proof of our representation result.
Remark 3.1. The assumption of coherence is necessary in this theorem. To see this, consider the
domain N constructed in Example 2.6:
fa0 w a1 w : : :g [ fc; d;?g:
The compact saturated sets in this domain are exactly the upper closures of all these finite elements,
together with the upward closure of fc; dg. However, the conjunction of the two clauses fcg and fdg is
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not represented as a compact saturated set, though it makes perfect sense as a theory. It is easy to draw
the Hasse diagrams of both the set of compact saturated sets and the set of theories to see that these two
domains are not isomorphic.
COROLLARY 3.4 (Compactness). A clause is a logical consequence of a theory T iff it is a logical
consequence of a finite subset of T .
Proof. We claim that the compact elements of the space of theories are exactly the logical closures
of finite theories. To see this, we recall that the compact elements of the domain of compact saturated
sets are indeed the compact open subsets in the Scott topology of that domain (Theorem 2.15). By the
proof of Theorem 3.2 we have that
[[T ]] D
\
fU j (9X 2 T )("X µ U )g:
If T is finite then [[T ]] D [[ ¯T ]] is compact open, by the above equation. (Here ¯T is the closure of T
under logical consequence.) Conversely, if K is compact open then K is [[T ]] D [[ ¯T ]] for some finite T ,
namely f„K g, where „K is the set of minimal elements of K . Thus the order-isomorphism [[¢]] restricts
to the closures of finite theories and the compact opens. This establishes our claim.
Now suppose that the theory T jD X . The collection of closures of finite subcollections of T is a
directed set of compact elements of the space of theories and its least upper bound is the closure of T .
Since the closure of X is contained in the closure of T and is itself a compact element, this means that
X is in the closure of one of the finite subcollections of T , as desired.
Remark 3.2. One can avoid the use of Theorem 2.15 in the foregoing proof by making the space
of Scott-open filters over D into a dcpo SOF(D) under the inclusion ordering. Then it is easy to check
that the finite elements of SOF(D) are the principal filters generated by compact open subsets of D and
by showing that the map ‚T :J (T ) is an isomorphism sending the logical closure of a finite theory to
the principal filter generated by the intersection of the compact opens corresponding to each clause in
the finite theory.
We use Corollary 3.4 to characterize theories as ideals in the v] preorder.
PROPOSITION 3.5. A theory over D is logically closed iff it is an ideal.
Proof. Suppose T is a logically closed theory. We show that T is an ideal. The downward closedness
of T follows directly from logical closure. We claim that T is directed. For a finite subcollection F of
T , put
Z :D
\
f"X j X 2 Fg:
By coherence,„Z , the set of minimal elements of Z , is a clause; moreover, T jD „Z . By logical closure
„Z is a member of T , and it is clearly an upper bound for F .
Conversely, let I be an ideal. If I jD X , then by Corollary 3.4, there is a finite subcollection F D
fX1; : : : ; Xng of I such that F jD X . By directedness of I , there is a Y 2 I with X1; : : : ; Xn v] Y . It
follows that Y jD X or X v] Y . But Y 2 I and so X 2 I by downward closure of I .
EXAMPLE 3.2. We close this section by applying Corollary 3.4 to give a proof of the compactness
theorem in classical propositional logic. Clearly it gives a compactness result for Kleene’s 3-valued
propositional logic already. For the classical result, just notice that a theory T entails a clause X
classically if and only if T together with f(v _ :v) j v 2Varg entails X in Kleene’s logic.
4. A RESOLUTION RULE
We now investigate a rule of inference for logical entailment in the space of theories over D. Some
notation will be useful.
DEFINITION 4.1. Let fa1; : : : ; ang be a finite subset of KD. By mubfa1; : : : ; ang we mean the set of
minimal elements of "fa1g \ ¢ ¢ ¢ \ "fang.
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The set mubfa1; : : : ; ang is in fact the set of minimal upper bounds of all of the ai s. It is a finite set
of compact elements, by the definition of algebraic coherence.
EXAMPLE 4.1. Refer to Example 2.4. We have mubfa; bg D fc; dg.
DEFINITION 4.2. Let fX1; : : : ; Xng be a clause set. The clausal hyperresolution rule (HR) is the
following, where Y is a clause:
X1 X2 ¢ ¢ ¢ Xn; ai 2 Xi for 1 • i • n; mubfa1; : : : ; ang jD Y
Y [S1•i•n(Xinfai g) :
This rule applies to a clausal theory whenever X1; : : : ; Xn are clauses of the theory and we can find
ai 2 Xi satisfying the condition mubfa1; : : : ; ang jD Y . We allow the set fa1; : : : ; ang to be inconsistent.
In this case, mubfa1; : : : ; ang D ; jD;, so that we get the usual notion of resolution (generalized to
partial logic).
We need to adjoin two special rules to (HR) in order to get a complete proof system. First, we notice
that when one of the clauses Xi is empty, then the rule (HR) does not apply. However, classical logic
allows the inference of any clause from the empty clause. So we need to adjoin to (HR) a special rule
which allows the inference of any clause from a finite set of clauses, one of which is empty. Second,
we need a “getting-started” rule allowing the inference of the clause f?g from no assumptions. We
summarize the two special rules:
(EC) X1 X2 ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ¢ ¢ ¢ Xn
Y
and (GS) f?g :
The rule (HR) is sound. By this, we mean that if x 2 D satisfies each of X1; : : : ; Xn , then for any choice
of fa1; : : : ; ang and Y fulfilling the antecedent, x will satisfy the consequent. This is clear considering
the two cases for x : either ai v x for all i , in which case x is above some minimal upper bound of the
ai , and therefore satisfies Y , or some ai does not subsume x , in which case x jD Xinfai g.
Write X1; : : : ; Xn ‘⁄ X if X can be derived from X1; : : : ; Xn using the rule (HR) or the special
inference rules (EC) and (GS). More generally, for a theory T write T ‘⁄ X if X1; : : : ; Xn ‘⁄ X for
some X1; : : : ; Xn 2 T . Our first objective is to show that if fX1; : : : ; Xng jD X , then X1; : : : ; Xn ‘⁄ X .
We use this to prove the completeness theorem: if T jD X then T ‘⁄ X .
LEMMA 4.1 (Weakening). If E is a nonempty clause and E jD X then E ‘⁄ X.
Proof. First note that if E jD X and f 2 EnX then there is m 2 X with f v m, so E ‘ (E¡ f )[ fmg.
Iterating this process removes all elements of EnX so that E ‘⁄ D for some Dµ X . Without loss of
generality D 6D ;, since otherwise D ‘ X by the special inference rule. If now there is a c2 XnD then
choose a d 2 D. Then D ‘ (D ¡ d) [ fd; cg.
LEMMA 4.2. Let P and Q be nonempty clauses, and let P BC Q be the clause consisting of the union
of all the sets mubfp; qg; where p 2 P and q 2 Q. Then P; Q ‘⁄ P BC Q.
Proof. Let P D fp1; : : : ; pmg and Q D fq1; : : : ; qng. We seek a way to prove the clause P BC Q.
We do this using a combinatorial argument. For 0 • i • m ¡ 1 and 0 • j • n ¡ 1 let X (i; j) be the
clause
fp1; : : : ; pi ; q1; : : : ; q j g [
[
fmubfpk; qlg j m ‚ k > i; n ‚ l > jg
and in addition let X (m; 0) D P and X (0; n) D Q. Let S be the set of pairs (i; j) such that X (i; j) is in
the resolution closure of fP; Qg. Then it is easy to check that
† (m ¡ 1; n ¡ 1)2 S;
† (i C 1; j) and (i; j C 1)2 S ) (i; j)2 S;
† (m ¡ 1; j C 1)2 S ) (m ¡ 1; j)2 S;
† (i C 1; n ¡ 1)2 S ) (i; n ¡ 1)2 S.
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It follows by downward induction on i C j that (0; 0)2 S, or that P BC Q is in the resolution closure of
fP; Qg, as we wanted.
Remark 4.1. Notice that P BC Q is a clause which is logically equivalent to the theory fP; Qg—
they have the same set of models. Up to logical equivalence, therefore, BC is associative. In view of the
next corollary, this says that binary resolution—resolving on at most two clauses in the antecedent—is
sufficient for deriving logical consequences.
COROLLARY 4.3 (Completeness theorem). If T jD X then T ‘⁄ X.
Proof. Suppose that T jD X . By the compactness theorem (Corollary 3.4), there are finitely many
clauses X1; : : : ; Xn such that fX1; : : : ; Xng jD X . First assume these clauses are consistent. By Lemma 4.2
and induction,
X1; : : : ; Xn ‘⁄ E D X1 BC ¢ ¢ ¢ BC Xn:
Notice that E is logically equivalent to the conjunction of X1; : : : ; Xn . Thus X must be a logical
consequence of E , so that by Lemma 4.2, E ‘⁄ X .
If the collection fX1; : : : ; Xng is inconsistent, then choose a minimal subcollection of nonempty
clauses which is inconsistent. Then by induction the empty clause is derivable from this subcollection,
and then by the rule (EC), any clause will then be derivable.
5. CLAUSAL LOGIC PROGRAMMING IN COHERENT DOMAINS
As proved in the previous section, the hyperresolution rule is complete for deriving the logical
consequences of a consistent theory over the Smyth powerdomain. Our first goal is to state a similar
rule for deriving logical consequences of a disjunctive logic program over a coherent algebraic domain
D. We begin with this latter definition.
DEFINITION 5.1. A disjunctive logic program over D is a set P of rules of the form µ ˆ ¿ , where
µ; ¿ are clauses over D.
The idea of this definition is that a rule µ ˆ ¿ adds a clause µ to a theory whenever ¿ is entailed by
the theory.
EXAMPLE 5.1. A standard form of a disjunctive propositional logic program is a collection of rules
of the form
b1; : : : bm ˆ a1; : : : ; an;
where the a’s and b’s are propositional literals. The set of a’s is taken conjunctively and the set of b’s
is taken disjunctively. A particular example might be
p;:q; r ˆ s;:p:
In our formulation this corresponds to the rule
fp; q¯; rg ˆ fs p¯g:
Here we are referring to our running example of three-valued logic. The left side of such standard rules
will always translate to a domain-theoretic rule with a singleton clause in its “body”; more generally,
we allow disjunctive clauses as both body and head.
DEFINITION 5.2. Let P be a disjunctive logic program over D. An element e2 D is said to be a model
of P if for every rule µ ˆ ¿ in P , if e jD ¿ , then e jD µ . A clause Y is a logical consequence of P if
every model of P satisfies Y . We write ¯P for the set of all clauses which are logical consequences of P .
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EXAMPLE 5.2. In the previous example, s p¯r is a model of the program P consisting of just the one
given rule. However, the only logical consequences of P will be clauses containing the null pta?. This
is because ? itself is a model of P—it does not satisfy fs p¯g. This brings out an important difference
between 3-valued and 2-valued (classical) logic programs. Let R be the program qˆ p. In classical
terms, this is equivalent to q _ :p and so has this formula as a consequence. But as in the case of the
program P , the program R has only trivial logical consequences. To obtain the classical case, adjoin to
R all rules of the form
fv; v¯g ˆ f?g
for v a propositional variable. This forces any model of the augmented program R0 to be a total truth
assignment. So fq; p¯g will now in fact be a logical consequence of R0.
We will introduce an operator TP on the space of logically closed theories over D which will provide
the fixpoint semantics of the program P and then show that the least fixpoint of TP gives us the set
of logical consequences of P . In order to define TP we formulate the hyperresolution rule HR(P)
determined by P:
X1 X2 ¢ ¢ ¢ Xn; ai 2 Xi for 1 • i • n; µ ˆ ¿ 2 P; mubfai j 1 • i • ng jD ¿
µ [S1•i•n(Xinfai g) :
We say that µ [S1•i•n(Xinfai g) is an HR(P)-consequence of fX1; : : : ; Xng; further, we say that Y is
a HR(P)-consequence of a theory T if it is an HR(P)-consequence of some fX1; : : : ; Xngµ T .
In the next definition, we write Cn(T ) for the closure of the theory T under the clausal inference
rule. By the completeness theorem, this coincides with the logical closure of T .
DEFINITION 5.3. Let T be a logically closed theory over D, and let P be a program. We define
TP (T ) D CnfY j Y is an HR(P)-consequence of T g:
The intent of using the operator TP is as follows. We are interested in those clauses derivable from the
clause f?g using a finite sequence of applications of the rule HR(P), interleaved with applications of
the clausal inference rule. This set of clauses will be what we get by iterating the TP operator some finite
number of times. Technically, TP (T ) is the entire set of logical consequences (Cn) of one application
of the HR(P). This makes the computation of clauses generated by iterating the TP operator technically
problematic. It is easy to see, though, that any clause derivable by iterating the operator will in fact be
derivable (because of compactness) in the interleaved fashion we have suggested.
The operator TP maps logically closed theories to logically closed theories; it may be that TP (T ) is
inconsistent and so not an official element of the Smyth powerdomain of D. We do have, however, the
following result:
PROPOSITION 5.4. TP is a continuous function on the space of logically closed theories.
Proof. Let 3 be a directed set of theories. We have to show that
TP
‡[
3
·
D
[
T 23
TP (T ):
Since TP is clearly monotone, the inclusion of right in left is obvious. To go from left to right, suppose
that Z is a logical consequence of the set of HR-consequences of
S
3. Then by compactness, Z is a
logical consequence of a finite number of these HR-consequences. This means that in fact Z is a logical
consequence of the set of HR-consequences of some finite number X1; : : : ; Xm of clauses of
S
3 and
therefore of some particular T 23, since3 is directed. This shows that Z is a member of the right hand
side as well.
By the Scott–Knaster–Kleene–Tarski theorem, TP has a least fixpoint fixTP . We are going to show
that ¯P D fixTP . Several lemmas will prepare the way. The first two lemmas are from [RZ97].
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LEMMA 5.1. In a coherent algebraic domain D; every compact saturated set is the upward closure
of the set of its minimal elements.
Proof. This is a generalization of the proof in [RZ97] from Scott domains to coherent algebraic
domains.
Let N be compact saturated. Since N is saturated, N is the intersection of all Scott opens O such that
O ¶ N . However, each Scott open set can be expressed as an (infinite) union of compact open sets.
Since N is compact, we know that N is in fact the intersection of all compact Scott opens O such that
O ¶ N .
For any element x 2 N , we want to show that there exists a minimal element y 2 N such that x w y.
Fix an arbitrary element x 2 N and consider a chain C in #x \ N . We claim that the set of all compact
lower bounds of C is nonempty and directed. Indeed, let m and n be compact lower bounds for C .
There are a finite number of minimal upper bounds for m and n. Let b1 be such a minimal upper bound.
Consider the set C1of elements of C above b1. If this is not all of C , then there are elements of C below
everything in C1, and not above b1, but some of these must be above some other minimal upper bound
b2. Fix such a b2 and let the set of elements of C above b2 but not b1 be C2. If C1 [ C2 is not all of C
then we repeat this argument. The argument terminates because there are only finitely many minimal
upper bounds of m and n, so that all of C must be above some minimal upper bound b of m and n,
whence b is the required element needed for directedness.
From the claim it follows that mC D
Ffm j m is a compact lower bound of Cg exists in D. Clearly
mC is a lower bound of C , for each c in C is the least upper bound of all compact elements subsuming
it. We show that mC is a member of #x \ N , as well. Let O be any compact open set containing N .
Clearly, C µ O . Since O is compact, „O is a finite set, and O D"„O . Using the argument of the
previous paragraph, we have that there exists some a 2 „O such that C µ"a, and hence mC 2 "a
(because a is a compact lower bound of C), which implies mC 2 O . Therefore, mC is a member of every
compact open set containing N , and so is in N by saturation.
To summarize, we have shown that for any element x 2 N , the nonempty set #x\N has the property
that every chain in it has a lower bound. By Zorn’s lemma, # x \ N has a minimal element, say, y. Such
a y is a minimal element of N subsuming x .
LEMMA 5.2 (Interpolation theorem). Let E be a compact saturated set over a coherent algebraic
dcpo; let g be a minimal element of E , and let d be a compact element subsuming g. For any compact
open set K such that K ¶ E , there exists a compact open set L such that
1. K ¶ L ¶ E ,
2. the minimal element l of L subsuming g is unique, and
3. d v l.
Proof. Once again the proof of this result in [RZ97] is for Scott domains. The following argument
generalizes our previous proof and corrects a minor error in it.
Choose a minimal element f of K subsuming g. Let l be a minimal upper bound of d and f such
that l v g. Let R D fx 2 K \ K(D) j x 6v gg. Consider the collection C of all "x for x 2 R together
with "l. We claim that this is an open cover of E . In proof, let e2 E . Without loss of generality, g does
not subsume e. Hence by algebraicity there is a compact element n 2 D such that n v e but n does not
subsume g. Since e2 E , then there is a b2„K with b v e. By coherence, there must be a minimal
upper bound m of b and n in K \K(D), so that m subsumes e but not g. Thus C is an open cover of E .
By compactness, C has a finite subcover for E . The union of the sets of this subcover has the desired
properties.
LEMMA 5.3. Let m be a minimal model of fixTP . Then m is a model of P.
Proof. Let m be a minimal model of fixTP . We must show that m is a model of P . Let µ ˆ ¿ be
a rule of P with m jD ¿ . Since fixTP is a logically closed theory, we know from Theorem 3.2 that the
set of all models of fixTP is a compact saturated set, which we choose as E in Lemma 5.2. In the same
lemma, take K D"? and g D m, and take d to be an element of ¿ with d v m. Consider the clause „L
consisting of the minimal elements of the compact open set L in the conclusion of the lemma. Then
fixTP jD„L , because [[fixTP ]] is a subset of L . Since fixTP is logically closed, we have„L 2 fixTP . Now
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consider the following (unary) instance of the hyperresolution rule
„L; l 2„L; µ ˆ ¿ 2 P flg jD ¿
µ [ („Lnflg) ;
where l is the unique generator of L subsuming m. The clause µ [ („Lnflg) is in TP (fixTP ) and so is
fixTP . Therefore m jD µ [ („Lnflg). But l is the only element of „L subsuming m, so it must be that
m jD µ .
LEMMA 5.4. TP ( ¯P)µ ¯P.
Proof. If Y 2 TP ( ¯P), then Y is a logical consequence of the HR-consequences of ¯P . We want to show
that every model of P satisfies Y . Let e be a model of P . It is enough to show that e satisfies each clause
of of the form µ [S1•i•n(Xinfai g), where Xi 2 ¯P , µ ˆ ¿ 2 P , ai 2 Xi , and mubfai j 1 • i • ng jD ¿ ,
because Y is a logical consequence of these clauses. Since each of the Xi are in ¯P , e jD Xi by definition.
If e jD ¿ then e jD µ because e is a model of P , so we are done. So suppose that it is not the case that
e jD ¿ . Then, because mubfai j 1 • i • ng jD ¿ , there must be some ai so that that ai does not subsume
e. Since e jD Xi , it must be the case that e jD Xinfai g, and we are again done.
THEOREM 5.5. ¯P D fixTP .
Proof. The inclusion fixTP µ ¯P follows from Lemma 5.4 by mathematical induction and the familiar
formula for the least fixed point of TP .
For the other direction, we prove that if X 2 ¯P , then fixTP jD X . (This implies that X 2 fixTP since
fixTP is logically closed.) It is sufficient, by Lemma 5.1 and Theorem 3.2, to show that any mini-
mal element of the compact saturated set [[fixTP ]] (i.e., a minimal model of fixTP ) is a model of X .
So let m 2 D be a minimal model of fixTP . By Lemma 5.3, m is a model of P , so m jD X because
X 2 ¯P .
6. NONMONOTONIC REASONING
In defining the concept of logical consequence of a program, we treated rules of the form µ ˆ ¿
as material implications. Such material implications cannot be translated into clauses, because they do
not have the persistence property—the set of models of a program need not be upward closed. This
nonmonotonicity is the essence of Zhang–Rounds’ power default reasoning [ZR97a]. Consider, for
example, the following program, expressing that birds fly, penguins are birds, but penguins do not fly:
fbg ˆ fpg;
f f g ˆ fbg;
f ¯f g ˆ fpg:
This program is in shorthand for the logic of partial truth assignments, as in Section 2. The partial
assignment bf is a model of the program, but the more specific bpf is not. Moreover, in nonmonotonic
reasoning, we would like the clause fbf g to be a nonmonotonic consequence of the clause fbg (i.e., birds
normally fly).
In this section we introduce a nonmonotonic version of the TP operator, called the extension operator,
owing its first incarnation to Reiter [Rei80]. This will allow us to define the concept of nonmonotonic
consequence and, in addition, will handle problems with inconsistent programs such as the two-rule
program
fpg ˆ f?g; f p¯g ˆ f?g:
We give both a syntactic and a semantic version of the operator. The semantic version, restricted to
Scott domains, appeared (in a different guise) in [RZ97] and [ZR97a]; the syntactic version is new.
196 ROUNDS AND ZHANG
We now think of a logic program as a set of default rules. One starts with a logically closed theory
as “given information,” applies a version of the hyperresolution rule modified to check for consistency
of rule application, and thereby derives possibly several logically closed theories called extensions of
the given theory. A clause is a nonmonotonic consequence of the given theory iff it is in all extensions
of the theory.
To begin, consider a unary version of the hyperresolution rule
X ; a 2„X ; µ ˆ ¿ 2 P; a jD ¿
µ [ (Xnfag) :
We define the associated unary program-resolution operator UP on theories as follows:
UP (T ) D Cnf(µ [ (Xnfag)) j X 2 T , µ ˆ ¿ 2 P , a 2„X , and a jD ¿ g:
By the proof of Lemma 5.3, UP has the same least fixed point as TP , namely ¯P . Note that in particular
we can choose the element a to be minimal in the clause X . We focus on this version of the unary rule
for the rest of the section.
EXAMPLE 6.1. Let T be the theory in 3-valued logic generated by the clause p _ q (officially, the
clause fp; qg). Consider the program given by the two rules r ˆ p and r ˆ q. Then UP (T ) contains
the clauses p _ r and q _ r , and U 2P (T ) contains the clause r .
DEFINITION 6.1. Say that a clause Y is consistent with a theory E if they have a model in common.
Write Y : E in this case.
In the next definition we limit the set of consequences of the unary rule to those which happen to be
consistent with a theory E .
DEFINITION 6.2. Fix a program P and let W and E be logically closed theories. A clause of the form
µ [ (Xnfag) is said to be an E-consistent consequence of W if there is a rule µ ˆ ¿ 2 P with X 2W ,
a 2 X , a jD ¿ , and (µ [ (Xnfag)) : E .
DEFINITION 6.3 (Syntactic extensions). Let T and E be logically closed theories. Define 0P (T; E) to
be the smallest logically closed theory W such that (i) T µW and (ii) every E-consistent consequence
of W is in W . If E is a consistent theory, and 0P (T; E) D E , we say that E is a (syntactic) extension
of T .
EXAMPLE 6.2. Let T be the theory generated by fp; qg (the official version of p _ q) and consider
the program P of the previous example. If E is generated by fpr; qrg then 0P (T; E) D E . In classical
notation, E is generated by the formula p ^ (q _ r ). The clause frg is a logical consequence of the
clause fpr; qrg and so is in E . It is a nonmonotonic consequence of fp; qg.
We are going to tie this notion of an extension to the semantic version of extensions found in [ZR97a]
and in [RZ97]. We first translate default (aka logic) programs to the compact saturated setting, obtaining
a semantic version of the notion of E-consistent consequence.
DEFINITION 6.4. Let P be a program, L , N be compact saturated, and K be compact open. A compact
open set of the form "(„µ [ („K ¡ fag)) is an N -consistent semantic consequence of L if there is a
rule µ ˆ ¿ 2 P with K ¶ L , a 2„K , a jD ¿ , and "(„µ [ („K ¡ fag)) \ N 6D ;.
DEFINITION 6.5 (Semantic extensions). Fix a program P , and let M and N be compact saturated.
The set ·P (M; N ) is the largest compact saturated set L (i) contained in M , and (ii) such that every
N -consistent semantic consequence of L contains L . We say that the nonempty c.s.s. N is a semantic
extension of M if ·P (M; N ) D N .
We can compare these two notions of extension easily, using duality:
THEOREM 6.6. Fix a program P. Then for any logically closed theories T and E; we have that E is
a syntactic extension of T if and only if [[E]] is a semantic extension of [[T ]]; with respect to P.
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Proof. We simply show that [[0P (T; E)]]D ·P ([[T ]]; [[E]]). First we prove that [[0P (T; E)]]µ ·P
([[T ]]; [[E]]) by showing that (i) [[0P (T; E)]]µ [[T ]], and (ii) [[0P (T; E)]] is closed under [[E]]-consistent
semantic consequence. Part (i) follows from duality since0P (T; E) ¶ T . For part (ii), let K be compact
open, K ¶ [[0P (T; E)]], a 2„K , and µˆ ¿ be a rule of P with a jD ¿ and "(„µ[(„K¡fag))\[[E]] 6D ;.
Take the clause X to be „K . Then (µ [ (Xnfag)) : E and so it is in 0P (T; E). Thus "µ [ (Xnfag) ¶
[[0P (T; E)]], as we wanted.
Conversely, we can show that Th(·P ([[T ]]; [[E]])) is a theory (i) containing T , and (ii) closed under
E-consistent syntactic consequence. This is sufficient to be able to apply duality and to finish the proof.
The details are straightforward.
The definition of extensions in [RZ97] is slightly different from that presented above. The rest of this
section is devoted to showing how the definitions are related. A convenient way to do this is to present the
general definition of extensions in a Scott domain. This definition applies to our case, because the Smyth
powerdomain of a coherent algebraic dcpo is indeed a Scott domain. We start with a general presentation
of defaults. In the following definition we intend to specialize A to be the Smyth powerdomain of a
coherent algebraic dcpo D.
DEFINITION 6.7. Let (A;v) be a Scott domain. A default set is a subset 1 of KA £ KA. We call a
pair (a; b) 2 1 a (normal) default.
The motivation for this definition is from Reiter’s default logic, where the Scott domain in question
is the collection of logically closed classical propositional theories and where a and b are propositional
theories generated by single formulas. A pair (a; b) is thought of as a normal default rule
a : b
b
in Reiter’s notation, with the intuitive meaning that if a is a formula in a theory, and b is consistent with
a (guessed) theory, then b is in the theory too.
Our notions of syntactic and semantic defaults can be presented using the definition of default set.
Here we take the Scott domain A to be either the space of consistent theories over D or the (isomorphic)
space of nonempty compact saturated sets over D. Fix a program P . Then the syntactic default set
determined by P is the set
f(Cn(X );Cn(Y )) j for some (µ ˆ ¿ )2 P , a jD ¿ , and a 2„X , we have Y D µ [ (Xnfag)g:
Similarly, P determines the semantic default set
f(K ; L) j K 2K˜D and for some (µˆ ¿ )2 P , a jD ¿ , and a 2„K , we have L D "(„µ [ („Knfag))g:
These two default sets are isomorphic under duality.
EXAMPLE 6.3. There is a big difference between defaults in the standard sense of default logic and
our clausal syntactic defaults, which are normal defaults in the domain of clausal theories, generated
by the resolution rule. Consider, for example, the defaults generated by the program P with two rules
r ˆ p and r ˆ q . Using standard default logic, this would be translated to the two default rules
p : r
r
and
q : r
r
: (1)
But using the unary resolution operator UP , we put (fp; qg; fr; qg) and (fp; qg; fp; rg) into the syntactic
default set, among (infinitely) many other such pairs. In Reiter’s notation, we would generate the clausal
defaults
(p _ q) : (r _ q)
(r _ q) and
(p _ q) : (p _ r )
(p _ r ) : (2)
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It is this behavior which enables us to do default “reasoning by cases.” In the present example, notice
that if we start with the clause fp; qg, representing the formula p _ q, the rules in (1) do not apply.
However, the rules in (2) do apply, allowing the adjunction of the formulas r _q and p_r . The formula
r is a logical consequence of these two formulas together with p _ q, so that we may infer r as a
nonmonotonic consequence of p _ q. Notice, though, that there is nothing nonmonotonic about this
situation. If T is a given theory, and P is a program, we may consider the subdomain "T of the domain
of theories and compute the least fixpoint of TP , or equivalently UP , with respect to this domain. The
result will be the set of consequences of P with respect to the starting theory T . The rules exemplified by
(1) are thus not really the right rules with which to do deductions starting with disjunctive information.
We should be using clausal inference rules instead. (See below for more on the property of reasoning
by cases—Theorem 6.12.)
The notion of default set enables the definition of a general extension operator in a Scott domain.
Again, A is intended to be the Smyth powerdomain of an underlying domain D. Here A> is the Scott
domain A augmented with an inconsistent top element. Also, by x : y we mean that x and y have an
upper bound in A.
DEFINITION 6.8. The function » (x; e) is the least element y of A> such that (i) x v y, and (ii) for any
default (a; b)21, if a v y and b : e, then b v y. We paraphrase (ii) by saying that y is closed under
e-consistent default application. We call e2 A an extension of x 2 P if » (x; e) D e.
It should be clear that the abstract » operator specializes to the syntactic 0 and the semantic extension
operator · using the domain of theories and the domain of compact saturated sets, respectively.
We still need to consider the form of defaults used in [RZ97]. This is presented using the notion of
an update.
DEFINITION 6.9. Let K be a compact open subset of the coherent algebraic dcpo D. If µ is a clause,
and a 2„K , we say that
K [aˆ a \ µ ] D K \ "(„µ [ („K ¡ fag))
is an update of K . This update is said to be based on a rule µ ˆ ¿ of P if a jD ¿ and a 2„K .
This definition says that an update of the set K of models of a clause consists of intersecting K with
the set of models of a succedent of (the unary version of) the hyperresolution rule.
As above, we can form a default set based on updates:
f(K ; L) j K 2K˜D and L is an update of K based on a rule µ ˆ ¿ in Pg:
The update default set gives rise to the same semantic extensions as does the semantic default set
determined by P . This is a consequence of an observation about general default sets in a Scott domain,
found in [ZR97b, Proposition 2.3]:
PROPOSITION 6.10. Let 1 be a default set in a Scott domain. Form the set
10 D f(a; a t b) j (a; b)21 ^ a : bg:
Then e is an extension of x with respect to 1 iff it is an extension of x with respect to 10.
This result shows that using updates gives us the same notion of extension as we get from our original
definition of a semantic extension, because in the domain of compact saturated sets, K \ L is the least
upper bound of the consistent compact open sets K and L .
The definitions in this section allow us to generalize two theorems in [RZ97] from Scott domains to
coherent algebraic dcpos. For the first theorem, we define (relative to a program P over the coherent
domain D) an element e2 D to be safe for a compact saturated set M if it is both in M and is a model
of P . An extension N of M is safe if it has at least one safe element as a member.
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THEOREM 6.11 (Dichotomy theorem). Fix a default program. If there exists an element e which is
safe for M; then there will be a unique safe semantic extension N of M. If M does not contain a safe
element, then the (multiple) extensions of M will all be of the form "g; for certain g 2M.
THEOREM 6.12 (Extension splitting theorem). Fix a default program. Consider two nonempty com-
pact saturated sets M1 and M2. Then any semantic extension N of M1 [ M2 can be written as a union
N D N1 [ N2; where N1 and N2 are either empty or extensions of M1 and M2; respectively.
It is not hard to extend the proofs of these theorems given in [RZ97] to coherent algebraic dcpos.
One needs only the interpolation theorem (Theorem 5.2) and some general results about extensions in
a Scott domain.
Theorems 6.11 and 6.12 provide a syntactic version of the result that the problem of deciding non-
monotonic consequences of a standard formula ` in Kleene’s three-valued logic is a problem complete
for co-NP(4), the fourth level of the Boolean hierarchy (see [ZR97a]). Using the extension splitting
theorem, we can obtain the principle of reasoning by cases: if X is a nonmonotonic consequence of
Y and also of Z then it is a consequence of Y [ Z . (This law fails for standard default logic—see
Example 6.3.)
We close the section by applying Theorem 6.11 to relate monotonic and nonmonotonic inference.
THEOREM 6.13. Let P be a consistent logic program. Then the set fixTP of logical consequences of
P is the unique extension of the (logical closure of ) the theory ff?gg with respect to P; considered now
as a set of default rules.
Proof. If P has a model, then the set D D"f?g is safe; so by the dichotomy theorem it will have a
unique (semantic) extension. By duality, the theory ff?ggwill have a unique syntactic extension, say E .
Using the definition of the syntactic extension operator, we see that any application of the unary rule will
automatically be consistent with E , so applying this rule will be the same as applying the ordinary rule
UP . But applying UP repeatedly to ff?gg, interleaved with clausal inference steps, generates exactly
the clauses in fixTP D ¯P .
7. CONCLUSION
Although we have proposed a general framework for logic programming, it remains to be seen whether
or not significant progress can be made toward implementable logic programming languages based on
the framework. We are currently working toward at least a first-order instantiation of our system. A first
step has been made to build the clausal logic approach in the concrete setting of information systems
[ZR99]. Whether this can be extended to higher order logics is debatable—one needs to marry an explicit
syntax for higher-order logic to the abstract model theory. Partial logic, however, may be one key to
progress—higher-order logic has traditionally not been partial. Our work suggests that clausal partial
logic may be a way to proceed. Further evidence for this can be found in the recent work of Coquand
and Zhang which shows that clausal logic and the clausal resolution rule arise naturally in the spectral
theory of coherent locales [CZ00]. One may also wish to work within the collection of Scott domains.
There the least upper bound operation in the underlying domain corresponds to unification. Finally, it
would be desirable to integrate a theory of types into our framework.
Our version of default reasoning has been shown in [ZR97a] to have better complexity properties
than does standard default logic, for the propositional calculus. We have implemented this system in
[KRZ98]. The results show that default inference in our system is very close to standard propositional
inference, when one considers random instances. It also competes well with inference engines based on
more standard approaches, for specific benchmark problems. However, the overall utility of our approach
still needs to be compared with the method of stable models [BG94]. There are also reasonably large-
scale applications of nonmonotonic methods in the business domain [Mor98] and in natural language
semantics [LBAC96]; it remains to be seen whether or not a stable model theory for general domains
would provide a competitive framework for these application areas.
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